Zambian Constitutional Overhaul: A Political Gamble with Economic Stakes

The constitutional amendment process in Zambia is unfolding as a clear strategic maneuver ahead of the August 2026 elections. The ruling UPND government's initial push for change was a direct attempt to reshape the political playing field in its favor. The core of this effort, the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill No. 7 of_2025, sought to increase the number of parliamentary seats from 156 to 211 and adjust constituency boundaries. This is not a neutral administrative update; it is a fundamental shift in electoral arithmetic that critics argue constitutes a gerrymander designed to entrench the ruling party's advantage.

The legitimacy of this initial move was immediately challenged. In June 2025, the Constitutional Court struck down the bill, ruling it unconstitutional for failing to comply with Article 79, which mandates wide public consultation before constitutional amendments. The court's emphatic statement that reforms must be people-driven rather than initiated solely by the Executive or Legislature exposed a critical gap in the government's approach. This ruling was a procedural rebuke, forcing a retreat from a top-down process.

The government's response was to form a 25-member Technical Committee on Constitutional Amendments (TCCA) and launch nationwide consultations. This move, which gathered 11,860 submissions in just two months, was a necessary procedural fix to restore legitimacy. It demonstrated a responsiveness to the court's guidance and civil society pressure, a step praised by the Law Association of Zambia. Yet, the substance of the changes remains the central point of contention. The committee's final report recommended refinements but retained the core elements of the original draft, including the significant seat increase and boundary adjustments.

The bottom line is a classic political calculus. The government has now navigated the legal hurdle, but the underlying reform remains a tool for electoral advantage. The increase in seats from 156 to 211, coupled with the redrawing of boundaries, alters the distribution of political power. While proponents frame it as a move toward greater inclusivity, the sheer scale of the change and the timing-just months before a general election-invite skepticism. The process, though now more consultative, still serves a clear pre-election objective: to solidify the ruling party's position in the National Assembly. The technical committee's work has provided a veneer of public input, but the strategic intent behind the amendment's core provisions points squarely toward the 2026 vote.

Economic Engine: Copper's Record Surge and the 3M-Ton Ambition

Zambia is riding a powerful economic wave, with its copper sector poised for a historic year. The country is on track for record copper production this year, a timing that could not be more fortuitous. As major global producers face a string of supply shocks-from floods in the DRC to deadly collapses in Chile-Zambia stands out as one of the few places where output is rising. This has helped drive copper prices up more than 20% this year, with the metal trading near a record high. For a nation where copper contributes 15% of GDP and more than 70% of exports, this is a rare chance to capitalize on a global supply deficit and lift government coffers.

The political calculus is clear. President Hakainde Hichilema has made rapid copper growth central to his re-election pitch, targeting output of 3 million tons annually by early next decade. That would be more than triple current levels. The ambition is audacious, and the financial stakes are high. The government's own Roadmap notes that if production targets are met, direct mining employment could jump fourfold, adding hundreds of thousands of jobs to the economy. This expansion is already attracting a wave of investment, with miners announcing more than $10 billion of investments that could add roughly 1.2 million tons of annual output in the 2030s.

Yet the path to this 3-million-ton ambition is blocked by a critical bottleneck: human capital. The sector's growth is not just about finding ore; it's about having the skilled workforce to extract and process it. Analysis shows that Zambia's TVET system will not produce enough qualified graduates to meet the demand for technicians, craftspeople, and artisans. The typical mine workforce is 60% technicians, but in 2023, only 800 students graduated from institutions meeting industry quality standards, and just one in five had the qualifications needed for these roles. This gap threatens to become the single biggest constraint on the sector's expansion.

The government's plan is to leverage this moment, but execution is everything. The current investment surge is a direct response to a pro-business environment and historically high prices. However, without a parallel, massive scaling of technical training, the promise of a fourfold employment jump and a fiscal windfall could stall. The ambition is to triple output in six years, a stretch even for a well-resourced industry. For now, the economic engine is roaring, but its fuel is running dangerously low.

Debt Sustainability: The IMF's Mixed Verdict and Fiscal Discipline

The IMF's recent conclusion of Zambia's Extended Credit Facility review delivers a verdict of cautious relief. The immediate disbursement of SDR 139.88 million (about US$184 million) is a tangible vote of confidence, bringing total program disbursements to over $1.5 billion. This funding is critical for maintaining macroeconomic stability and supporting the government's ambitious growth targets. However, the assessment is a study in contrasts, highlighting both progress and persistent vulnerabilities.

On the positive side, the IMF acknowledges that Zambia's public debt is assessed as sustainable. This is a significant milestone, achieved through a combination of disciplined program execution and external debt restructuring. The government's revised 2025 budget, which aligns with program commitments, and its good progress on negotiating with external creditors are concrete steps toward restoring fiscal credibility. The economic outlook itself is improving, with real GDP growth projected at 5.8 percent in 2025, driven by a recovery in mining and services. This growth provides a necessary buffer.

Yet, the underlying fiscal picture remains fragile. The IMF explicitly noted that the country remains at high risk of overall and external debt distress. This high-risk status stems directly from missed targets, particularly in the revenue domain. The program's three end-March 2025 indicative targets-on non-mining tax revenues, arrears clearance, and reserve accumulation-were missed. This is the core vulnerability. Without a robust and growing tax base, the government lacks the domestic resources to fund essential spending and service debt without external support. The IMF's call for revenue-led fiscal consolidation is therefore not optional; it is the essential mechanism to reduce reliance on volatile external financing and move from high-risk to moderate-risk status.

The path forward is now under the shadow of the 2026 election cycle. This introduces a powerful political pressure for increased spending, which could easily jeopardize the hard-won fiscal discipline. The IMF's stress on sustained budget discipline ahead of the 2026 elections is a direct warning. The success of the program hinges on the government's ability to resist populist impulses and continue prioritizing structural reforms, tax administration improvements, and spending reprioritization. The bottom line is that while the immediate debt sustainability risk has been managed, the country's fiscal health remains precarious. The IMF's verdict is clear: the window for consolidation is open, but it is narrow, and it will be tested by the political calendar.

Risks & Guardrails: Where the Political-Economic Thesis Could Break

The investment thesis for Zambia's copper boom rests on a powerful political-economic narrative: a pro-business government leveraging a global supply crunch to attract record investment and triple production. This narrative is compelling, but it is built on shifting sands. The strategy faces three material risks that could derail the entire plan, from political instability to a crippling skills shortage.

The first and most immediate risk is political backlash that could fracture the pro-business environment. The government's ambitious constitutional reforms, particularly the controversial Bill 7, are a double-edged sword. While framed as modernization, critics see it as a blatant power play and a smell of gerrymandering. The proposed changes to constituency boundaries and the limited 30 reserved seats are viewed by opposition groups and civil society as attempts to entrench power ahead of the 2026 elections. This perception, if it takes hold, could fuel political instability and opposition cohesion, directly undermining the stable, investor-friendly climate that is attracting over $10 billion in new mining capital. The government's own actions-returning the bill to Parliament in its original form after a contentious review-suggest it is prioritizing speed over consensus, a move that could backfire.

The second, and more structural, risk is the looming skilled labor bottleneck. The government's target of 3 million tons annually by early next decade is a stretch, and the workforce pipeline is not ready. The expansion would require a fourfold increase in direct mining jobs, but Zambia's Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) system is severely under-resourced. In 2023, only 800 students graduated from institutions meeting quality standards, and just one in five had the qualifications for technician-level roles. This is a critical friction point. Without a massive, coordinated effort to expand and upgrade training-through industry partnerships, public financing, or specialized centers of excellence-the production targets become impossible to meet. A stalled mining sector would collapse the fiscal windfall and undermine the economic revival the government is promising.

The third risk is the sheer execution hurdle of the expansion plans themselves. The announced investments, while substantial, are not a guarantee of output. Major projects like the $2 billion expansion of Barrick's Lumwana mine are complex, multi-year endeavors. Other key projects, including an ambitious underground expansion and the first mine for newcomer KoBold Metals, face significant technical and financial challenges. The government's own analysis suggests the pledged investments alone will not be enough to hit the 3M-ton target. This means exploration efforts across the country must bear fruit, a process that is inherently uncertain and time-consuming. Failure to deliver on these projects would stall the production ramp-up, leaving Zambia unable to capitalize on the current supply shock and high prices.

The bottom line is that the copper boom thesis is a high-wire act. It depends on the government successfully navigating a minefield of political opposition, simultaneously solving a national skills crisis, and executing a portfolio of mega-projects. Any failure in these areas could transform a potential windfall into a costly distraction, derailing the economic turnaround and leaving the country's ambitious plans in tatters.