Venezuela's Multi-Commodity Gambit: Assessing the Investment Implications of a U.S.-Led Regime Change

The U.S. military operation on January 3, 2026, was not merely a regime change. It was a high-risk gamble to seize control of Venezuela's vast, multi-commodity wealth. The immediate objective, as stated by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, is to stop oil exports from funding the Maduro regime. To that end, the Department of the Treasury sanctioned four oil companies and four associated tankers last week, targeting the "shadow fleet" that continues to generate revenue for a destabilizing government. This action is part of a sustained campaign of pressure, built on the legal authority provided by Executive Order 13884.

Yet the administration's gaze extends far beyond crude. One day after the capture of President Maduro, officials began touting Venezuela's critical mineral resources. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick declared the country's mining sector "gone rusty" and promised it would be fixed. The White House confirmed it is "closely looking" at deposits of lithium and rare earth elements, materials vital for AI, defense systems, and renewable energy technologies. This is the broader strategic rationale: to leverage control over Venezuela's energy and mineral assets to advance U.S. industrial and military priorities in a competitive global landscape.

Executive Order 13884 provides the broad legal framework for this multi-commodity approach. It blocks the property of the entire Venezuelan government and its instruments, including state-owned enterprises like PDVSA. This sweeping authority creates a tool to sanction any sector of the economy, not just oil. It signals that the U.S. intends to systematically dismantle the Maduro regime's financial lifelines while positioning itself to eventually capture the economic value of the country's resources. The operation is a bold, unilateral assertion of power aimed at reshaping Venezuela's economic destiny for strategic gain.

The Oil Market: A Controlled Re-entry and New Sanctions Framework

The U.S. plan to restart Venezuelan crude sales is not a market liberalization. It is a carefully engineered, state-controlled re-entry designed to serve strategic interests while minimizing financial risk. The immediate mechanics are now in motion. The Treasury Department has granted a private waiver to a global trading firm, allowing it to resume purchases of Venezuelan crude for U.S. buyers with terms requiring that any initial shipment must be sold to buyers in the US. This is a departure from a broad, general license; it is a targeted, conditional permission.

The scale of the initial move underscores its tactical nature. The U.S. is in talks with leading trading firms and banks to immediately move 30 million to 50 million barrels of Venezuelan oil held in floating and onshore storage. This is a rapid-fire effort to unlock value from existing inventory, not to rebuild a long-term export pipeline. The goal is to generate immediate revenue, with the Treasury Department itself slated to oversee the funds generated from the sales. This direct financial oversight ensures that the economic benefit flows to the U.S. government, not to a revived Venezuelan state.

This creates a unique market scenario: a controlled re-entry. U.S. companies, particularly Gulf Coast refiners with the capability to process Venezuela's heavy, high-sulfur crude, may gain access to a potentially cheaper feedstock. Yet this access comes with strict political strings. The administration plans to partially lift sanctions while maintaining control over destinations, and the initial license conditions dictate that the first cargoes go to U.S. buyers. This framework effectively turns the U.S. government into a gatekeeper and a co-investor, dictating the terms of entry and capturing the upside.

The bottom line is a market in transition, not a free market. The controlled re-entry offers a path to cheap crude for American industry, but it embeds the entire transaction within a new, politically enforced regime. The price of that access is a loss of commercial autonomy for the buyers and a guarantee of U.S. control over the proceeds. This is the financial architecture of a strategic gambit.

Beyond Oil: The Gold and Critical Minerals Sanctions Landscape

The administration's ambition to fix Venezuela's "rusty" mining history faces a reality check. While the country possesses significant deposits of lithium and rare earth elements, the path to unlocking their value is blocked by operational chaos and a lack of reliable data. The mining sector has been overrun by illegal groups, and experts note there is no reliable data on those deposits. This isn't a simple matter of finding ore; it's about establishing control over territory and creating the basic conditions for any investment. The idea that major Western companies would rush in without "advanced political guarantees" is, as one analyst put it, "seems unlikely."

The hurdles extend beyond data gaps. Actual development would require billions of dollars in capital, decades of waiting times, and lots of political and economic risk. In the current environment of institutional instability, attracting that private sector confidence is the central challenge. The U.S. government's role would shift from a mere regulator to a de facto sovereign investor and security provider, a massive undertaking with no clear timeline or budget. This sets up a stark contrast with China's established presence in South American processing, which could give Beijing a competitive advantage in any future value chain for these materials.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is moving to cut off another key source of illicit finance: gold. The Treasury Department has targeted gold exports and related financial flows, applying the same sanctions framework used for oil. This is a direct blow to a sector that has long funded instability. The administration's plan is to fix Venezuela's mining history, but the immediate focus is on containment and control. The goal is to sever the link between Venezuela's mineral wealth and the groups that have profited from it, ensuring that any future economic activity is transparent and aligned with U.S. interests.

The bottom line is a landscape of high strategic intent but immense execution risk. The U.S. has the legal authority to sanction any sector, but turning Venezuela's critical mineral potential into a viable investment case requires solving problems that go far beyond sanctions. It demands years of rebuilding institutions, securing vast territories, and attracting capital in a market that is skeptical of the political outlook. For now, the focus remains on the controlled re-entry of oil and the immediate financial control of its proceeds, leaving the longer-term gamble on lithium and rare earths as a distant, uncertain prospect.

Catalysts, Scenarios, and Key Risks

The success of this high-stakes gambit hinges on a narrow set of forward-looking catalysts and faces two starkly different scenarios. The immediate test is the execution of the oil plan. A key signal will be the Treasury Department's announcement of a formal framework for critical minerals development, following its stated interest in the sector "closely looking" at Venezuela's critical minerals. The successful implementation of the oil sales plan, including the Treasury's oversight of proceeds, is the first concrete step. If the administration can demonstrate a controlled, revenue-generating re-entry for crude, it may build credibility for the longer-term, riskier mineral ambitions.

This sets up two primary scenarios. In the Success case, stable governance takes root. This allows U.S. firms to secure long-term contracts for both oil and minerals, reshaping global supply chains for strategic materials. The controlled re-entry of crude could provide a cheaper feedstock for American refiners, while a viable mining sector could supply critical inputs for AI and defense. This would validate the U.S. strategy as a successful, if costly, investment in national security and industrial policy.

The Failure scenario is more probable in the near term. Continued instability and the lack of reliable data on mineral deposits make large-scale investment unviable "no reliable data on those deposits". The mining sector's overrun by illegal groups and the sheer scale of capital and time required for development create a formidable barrier. Without "advanced political guarantees," major Western companies are unlikely to commit. In this outcome, the operation becomes a costly, symbolic gesture. The U.S. government would be left managing a vast, underdeveloped resource base, bearing the costs of security and institution-building without the economic returns, while China's established processing networks in South America could capture any future value.

The key risk for the entire strategy is the long-term viability of the U.S. position. The operation's success depends on the U.S. maintaining control and building institutions, a complex and uncertain task. The administration has shown it can use military force and sanctions, but governing a resource-rich nation is a different challenge. The risk is that the initial military success is followed by a protracted, expensive occupation of economic and political space. As one expert noted, the idea that major Western companies would invest without guarantees seems unlikely "seems unlikely". The U.S. would need to act as a de facto sovereign investor and security provider for years, a role with no clear exit strategy or budget. The bottom line is that the strategy is a bold bet on political control to unlock economic value, but the path from a captured capital to a functioning, investment-grade economy is fraught with institutional and financial hurdles.