Nuclear Energy: The US Must Learn From Asia's 'Manhattan Project' to Compete

The central investor question is whether the United States can close a widening gap in nuclear deployment speed and cost competitiveness with Asia. The policy ambition is clear, but the execution reality is stark. The Biden administration has set a target of deploying 200 GW of net new nuclear energy capacity by 2050, which requires a sustained build rate of 15 GW per year by 2040. This is a call to action for a domestic industry that has not operated at that pace for decades.

Contrast that with China's approach. In April 2025, the State Council approved the construction of 10 new nuclear reactors across five major projects with a total investment exceeding 200 billion yuan ($27.45 billion). This centralized, state-backed model enables rapid deployment, with reactors typically built in about five years at a cost of roughly $2.7 billion each. The US is not just behind in pace; it is facing a fundamental cost disadvantage.

The flagship example of this chasm is the Plant Vogtle project in Georgia. The two new reactors there took 15 years to build and cost $36.8 billion, more than double the initial projections. The result is that Vogtle will deliver the most expensive electricity in the world at $10,784 per kilowatt. This is a staggering figure, dwarfing the $900-$1,500 per kilowatt range for wind, solar, or natural gas. It is a direct outcome of a fragmented regulatory process, cost overruns, and a lack of industrial-scale manufacturing capability.

The bottom line is a policy and execution chasm. The US has the strategic intent and the technological foundation, but it lacks the industrial and regulatory machinery to deploy nuclear at the speed and cost required to meet its own ambitious targets. China's model demonstrates that a state-driven, vertically integrated approach can achieve rapid, cost-effective deployment. For the US to close the gap, it will need to fundamentally reform its licensing, permitting, and supply chain systems-a challenge that goes far beyond simply approving new projects.

The Cost and Speed Divide: Learning from China's Model

The stark contrast in nuclear construction between China and the U.S. reveals a fundamental difference in execution models. China builds reactors in approximately five years at a cost of $2.7 billion per unit. In stark contrast, the U.S. Vogtle project, completed in 2024, reached costs of around $27 billion for two reactors, translating to roughly $12 per watt of capacity. This isn't just a difference in price; it's a chasm in efficiency and risk management.

The root of this divide lies in structural advantages China leverages. Its state-backed financing provides low-cost capital and shields projects from the volatile market pressures that plagued Vogtle. Regulatory processes are streamlined, allowing for centralized decision-making that avoids the protracted legal challenges and environmental lawsuits that delayed the Georgia plant. Most critically, China has developed a fully domestic supply chain for nuclear equipment, eliminating the import dependencies and cost escalations that plagued early AP1000 builds in China itself.

The U.S. experience at Vogtle was a textbook case of first-of-a-kind (FOAK) project failure. As the first nuclear plant built in the U.S. in over a decade, it was a pioneering effort for the AP1000 design. This novelty bred immense uncertainty, leading to a cascade of delays and cost overruns. The project was further derailed by global catastrophes like the pandemic and the Fukushima disaster, which forced redesigns and regulatory hurdles. The result was a project that took over a decade to complete, far behind schedule and budget.

China's model, by contrast, is built on repetition and standardization. While its initial AP1000 builds also faced delays, the country's strategy is to learn from each project and apply those lessons to the next. By building reactors in series, it can achieve economies of scale, lock in supply chain efficiencies, and refine construction techniques. This is the core of its cost advantage: moving from a risky, one-off development to a repeatable industrial process.

The bottom line is that the U.S. pays a premium for innovation and regulatory complexity, while China pays for speed and state support. For the U.S. to compete, it must find a way to replicate China's industrial efficiency without adopting its top-down political model-a challenge that goes far beyond simply copying a reactor design.

The US Response: Policy Push and the SMR Bet

The United States is making a high-stakes strategic bet on small modular reactors (SMRs) as a cornerstone of its energy future. This isn't a passive market play but a deliberate, multi-layered policy push. At the federal level, the Department of Energy has committed $800 million in cost-shared funding to two "first-mover" teams: the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and Holtec International. The goal is clear: to deliver new nuclear generation in the early 2030s and establish a domestic supply chain. This funding is a direct attempt to de-risk the initial deployments, with the DOE framing it as essential to President Trump's "energy dominance" agenda and to fuel the manufacturing boom and AI growth that demand reliable, round-the-clock power.

The state level is moving in lockstep, creating a patchwork of supportive action. In 2024 alone, an estimated 43 states and U.S. territories took actions regarding advanced nuclear. This includes new legislation in states like Virginia and Kentucky that explicitly allows utilities to recover SMR development costs from ratepayers, a critical step to attract private capital. Other states, like Kentucky, are directing regulators to prepare for siting and construction, while New York and Massachusetts are studying how to integrate nuclear into their clean energy portfolios. This widespread, bipartisan activity signals a growing political consensus that SMRs are a viable tool for energy security and decarbonization.

Yet the fundamental challenge of cost remains a persistent hurdle, even with this new policy support. Projections for the "next commercial offering" (NOAK) of SMRs still range from $12 to $15 per watt. This is a significant improvement over the astronomical costs of first-of-a-kind (FOAK) plants, but it underscores that the technology is not yet a cheap solution. The federal funding and state cost-recovery mechanisms are designed to bridge this gap, aiming to turn the initial, high-cost deployments into the standardized, lower-cost models that can drive down the price for future units. The success of the TVA and Holtec projects will be a critical test of this entire strategy. If they can deliver on schedule and within a reasonable cost envelope, they will validate the policy approach and open the door for a fleet-scale rollout. If they encounter delays or cost overruns, the entire SMR narrative risks being set back, highlighting the immense execution risk embedded in this national energy bet.

Risks and Guardrails: The Path to a Sustainable Nuclear Renaissance

The US strategy to revive nuclear power rests on three pillars: federal funding, advanced technology like SMRs, and a target deployment window in the early 2030s. Stress-testing this plan reveals three critical risks that could derail the renaissance before it gains momentum. The first is the specter of cost overruns, a pattern set by the $36.8 billion, 15-year construction of Plant Vogtle. This project, which cost more than twice its initial estimate and delivered the most expensive electricity in the world, is a powerful deterrent. It demonstrates how false cost estimates and regulatory failures can lead to massive financial overruns that burden ratepayers and destroy investor confidence. For the SMR push to succeed, this precedent must be broken, not repeated.

The second risk is regulatory uncertainty. The path to deployment is not just technical but bureaucratic. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is currently reviewing TVA's construction permit application for its first SMR. Any delays in this review process directly threaten the early 2030s deployment target. The NRC's pace and the potential for new, unforeseen requirements could introduce significant project delays and cost increases, undermining the very predictability that SMRs are supposed to offer.

The third, and perhaps most volatile, risk is public and political opposition. The Vogtle project's legacy includes a report by six Georgia consumer groups that frames the reactors as a "radioactive money-pit" and a cautionary tale. This kind of narrative, fueled by past failures and cost concerns, can lead to project cancellations or increased regulatory hurdles. The success of the SMR program depends on overcoming this skepticism and building a new consensus around nuclear's role in clean energy.

The guardrails for success are clear. First, strict financial discipline and transparency are non-negotiable. The industry must move beyond the Vogtle playbook, with independent cost oversight and no tolerance for false estimates. Second, regulatory predictability must be engineered. The NRC review process needs to be streamlined and its outcomes more certain to provide the stability private investors need. Third, a proactive public engagement strategy is essential to counter the negative narrative and build trust. Without these guardrails, the nuclear renaissance risks becoming another expensive lesson in how not to build a clean energy future.