The High-Stakes Gamble: Erik Prince’s Congo Deal and the Race for Critical Minerals

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) sits atop one of the world’s most valuable mineral troves, yet its riches remain shackled by corruption, conflict, and mismanagement. Now, a controversial deal between the DRC and Erik Prince—a Trump ally and founder of the Blackwater private military firm—has thrust the nation into the center of a geopolitical scramble for cobalt, lithium, and other critical minerals. The agreement, focused on boosting tax collection and securing mineral exports, could reshape global supply chains and U.S.-China competition. But its success hinges on navigating a minefield of risks, from rebel groups to Prince’s own checkered past.

The Mineral Bonanza at Stake

The DRC produces 220,000 tonnes of cobalt annually, nearly two-thirds of global supply, as well as 70% of the world’s tantalum and significant reserves of tin, tungsten, and lithium—all critical for electric vehicles, smartphones, and renewable energy systems. Yet the nation’s mineral wealth has long been a curse. Smuggling, corruption, and armed groups like the M23 rebels siphon an estimated $40 million per month from Katanga’s copper and cobalt mines alone. The DRC’s government, which derives 80% of its export revenue from minerals, has struggled to capture these funds.

Prince’s proposal aims to address this gap. His team will advise the DRC on tax enforcement, logistics, and security for mining operations, starting in Katanga, a region rich in copper but relatively stable compared to the war-torn east. The U.S. sees this as a chance to counter China’s dominance in Congolese mining—a sector where state-owned firms like China Molybdenum control key projects. Meanwhile, the EU’s $935 million deal with Rwanda for tin and tungsten highlights the broader stakes in a region where minerals are both a resource and a weapon.

Tesla’s soaring demand for cobalt and lithium has fueled investor interest in companies exposed to Congolese minerals. However, the DRC’s instability poses a red flag for long-term supply reliability.

The Prince Factor: A Controversial Play for Influence

Prince’s involvement raises eyebrows. His Blackwater firm’s reputation was tarnished by the 2007 Nisour Square massacre in Iraq, and his 2023 plan to deploy mercenaries to combat M23 rebels—a scheme abandoned after UN criticism—showed how his methods clash with international norms. The U.S. Treasury even sanctioned his firm Frontier Services Group (FSG) in 2023 for allegedly training Chinese military pilots, a charge FSG denied.

Yet in Africa, Prince has found a niche. His companies have operated in the DRC since 2015, including a 2017 gold refinery venture linked to Kabila-era corruption. Critics warn that his return could entrench opaque deals and militarize mineral extraction. “Prince’s track record suggests he’ll prioritize profit over transparency,” says a Brussels-based analyst. “That’s a recipe for more conflict, not stability.”

Risks: Conflict, Corruption, and Geopolitical Tensions

The M23 rebellion, which seized eastern cities in early 2025, complicates the deal. While Prince’s team avoids conflict zones, the rebels control mineral-rich areas like the Ituri region, where gold and tin are looted to fund weapons. The DRC accuses Rwanda of backing M23—a claim Rwanda denies but which the UN and NGOs like Global Witness corroborate.

Even in Katanga, success isn’t assured. The DRC’s $2 billion annual mining revenue loss to smuggling reflects systemic corruption, not just poor security. Without reforms to tackle bribery and opaque contracts, Prince’s technical advice may prove futile. “This isn’t just about hiring mercenaries—it’s about rewriting how the DRC’s economy works,” says a Kinshasa-based economist.

The Geopolitical Chessboard

The U.S. sees the DRC deal as part of a broader minerals-for-security framework, akin to its agreements with allies like Qatar for energy. But without a clear U.S. military or diplomatic commitment, the burden falls on Prince’s private team—a risky move in a region where private contractors often lack accountability.

China’s entrenched position is another hurdle. Its firms have deep ties to Congolese elites and can undercut U.S. efforts. Meanwhile, the EU’s Rwanda partnership underscores how neighboring states exploit the DRC’s fragility. “The DRC’s minerals are a prize everyone wants—but no one wants to fix its governance,” says a Geneva-based conflict analyst.

Conclusion: A Gamble with Global Implications

Erik Prince’s Congo deal is a high-risk, high-reward play. If successful, it could stabilize a critical mineral supply chain, boost the DRC’s economy, and weaken China’s leverage. But the odds are stacked against him. The DRC’s $40 million monthly smuggling losses alone suggest systemic flaws that no private contractor can fix alone.

Investors should weigh the potential rewards—Congolese cobalt’s dominance in EV batteries, for instance—against the risks of conflict and corruption. The DRC’s GDP per capita of $400 (among the world’s lowest) and 60% poverty rate underscore how mineral wealth rarely translates to public good.

The real test lies beyond Prince’s team. The U.S. must decide whether to back a minerals-for-security pact that requires addressing the root causes of instability—corruption, weak governance, and regional rivalries. Without that, Prince’s deal may end up as another chapter in the DRC’s tragic cycle of resource-driven conflict.

Data shows the DRC’s mineral wealth has failed to translate into sustained economic growth, highlighting the challenges ahead.