Geopolitical Risk and the Strategic Imperative of Nuclear Energy Resilience in Conflict Zones

In an era where energy security and geopolitical stability are inextricably linked, nuclear energy infrastructure in conflict zones has emerged as both a critical vulnerability and a strategic priority. The ongoing war in Ukraine has starkly illustrated the risks of weaponizing nuclear facilities, with the Zaporizhzhia and Chernobyl nuclear power plants (NPPs) becoming focal points of international concern. As global investments in nuclear energy surge-projected to reach USD 150 billion annually by 2030 under net-zero scenarios, as highlighted in Kurando's paper Kurando's paper-the imperative to safeguard these facilities against conflict-related disruptions has never been more urgent.

The Vulnerability of Nuclear Infrastructure in Conflict Zones

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 exposed profound weaknesses in the resilience of nuclear infrastructure. The Zaporizhzhia NPP, Europe's largest nuclear plant, has been occupied by Russian forces since March 2022 and has faced repeated attacks, including drone strikes and power supply disruptions, according to a Security and Defence study Security and Defence study. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the plant now relies on a single off-site power line, heightening the risk of a catastrophic failure, a point underscored in an EU statement on nuclear safety EU statement on nuclear safety. Similarly, the Chernobyl NPP, still reeling from the 1986 disaster, has been subjected to military occupation and sabotage attempts, as that Security and Defence study documents. These incidents underscore how nuclear facilities can become collateral damage-or deliberate targets-in modern warfare, with dire consequences for both local populations and global radiological safety.

The weaponization of nuclear infrastructure is not merely a technical or operational issue but a geopolitical one. As Maria Kurando notes in Nuclear Security in Conflict Zones, the absence of robust international mechanisms to protect nuclear facilities during conflicts has created a dangerous vacuum. The Geneva Conventions' Article 56, which prohibits targeting nuclear plants, remains inconsistently enforced, leaving facilities in war-torn regions exposed to exploitation by belligerents seeking to destabilize energy systems, as a Stimson Center analysis warns Stimson Center analysis.

International Responses and Funding Initiatives

The international community has responded with a mix of diplomatic pressure, technical support, and targeted funding. The IAEA has deployed 196 missions to Ukrainian nuclear sites since 2022, delivering safety equipment and maintaining a continuous presence to prevent accidents, as detailed on the IAEA response page IAEA response page. In 2022, the U.S. allocated $35 million to prepare for potential nuclear incidents in Ukraine, including radiation detection systems and protective measures for plant staff, according to TIME TIME. The European Union has also contributed €7.2 million to the IAEA's efforts, emphasizing the need for Russia to allow essential repairs at Zaporizhzhia.

Beyond immediate crisis management, multilateral institutions are pivoting toward long-term resilience strategies. The World Bank Group and IAEA formalized a partnership in June 2025 to support nuclear infrastructure in developing countries, including extending the lifespan of aging reactors and building new facilities with conflict resilience in mind, through a World Bank–IAEA partnership World Bank–IAEA partnership. This collaboration aligns with the IAEA's broader push to integrate standoff technologies-such as satellite imagery and crowdsourced data-into post-conflict recovery frameworks, a point also discussed in the Security and Defence study. Such tools enable rapid damage assessments and prioritize reconstruction efforts, as demonstrated in Kyiv's transport network recovery and a conflict-resilience framework conflict-resilience framework.

Emerging Strategies and the Path Forward

The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has outlined a five-year plan (FY 2025–2029) to address global nuclear threats, emphasizing nonproliferation, security upgrades, and partnerships with over 100 countries, as summarized in the NNSA plan NNSA plan. This strategy includes hardening nuclear facilities against military threats, a measure advocated by the Stimson Center as critical for regions like Ukraine. Meanwhile, the development of small modular reactors (SMRs) is gaining traction as a decentralized solution to enhance energy resilience. SMRs' compact design and reduced reliance on centralized grids make them less vulnerable to large-scale attacks, a feature that the Kurando paper highlights.

For Ukraine, the path to recovery involves not just restoring existing infrastructure but reimagining its energy sector. The country aims to modernize its grid, integrate renewable energy, and expand nuclear capacity while adhering to European energy standards, as discussed in the Security and Defence study. This dual focus on diversification and resilience is echoed in the World Bank's 2020–2025 Fragility, Conflict, and Violence (FCV) Strategy, which prioritizes infrastructure investments in conflict-affected regions to prevent long-term instability World Bank FCV Strategy.

Conclusion: A Call for Coordinated Action

The war in Ukraine has served as a wake-up call for the global community. As nuclear energy becomes a cornerstone of decarbonization efforts, its infrastructure must be shielded from the ravages of conflict. This requires not only immediate funding and technical support but also a reevaluation of international legal frameworks to enforce protections for nuclear facilities. Investors, policymakers, and institutions must collaborate to ensure that nuclear energy remains a tool for peace and sustainability, not a weapon of war.