China’s Power Play: Xi Tightens Grip with Military Purge and Tech Push as Beijing Maps Its Next Five-Year Plan

China’s Communist Party wrapped up its closely watched Fourth Plenum this week with an agenda that reaffirmed Xi Jinping’s leadership, advanced a new phase of industrial and technological strategy, and deepened the ongoing anti-corruption purge within the military’s top ranks. The four-day, closed-door meeting of the Party’s 20th Central Committee concluded Thursday in Beijing, producing a communique that outlines the framework for the upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030). While the session offered no hints of leadership succession, it underscored the Party’s growing focus on technological self-reliance, manufacturing modernization, and national security amid intensifying rivalry with the United States.

The plenum—one of the most important political gatherings in China’s policymaking cycle—serves as a midterm checkpoint between Party Congresses, setting the tone for the next phase of China’s development agenda. This session was particularly significant as it finalizes the recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan, which will be formally adopted at the National People’s Congress in March. Five-year plans, a fixture of Chinese governance since the 1950s, act as the country’s macroeconomic blueprint, blending political goals with economic priorities. The 15th iteration is expected to guide China through a more uncertain global landscape defined by geopolitical tensions, slower growth, and a race for technological independence.

According to the communique released by Xinhua, the Party reaffirmed its commitment to “building a modern industrial system with advanced manufacturing as its backbone.” The focus areas for the 2026–2030 period include expanding China’s domestic market, deepening industrial modernization, accelerating the green transition, and achieving “substantial improvements in scientific and technological self-reliance.” This language reflects Beijing’s recognition that economic resilience now depends less on export-led growth and more on domestic innovation—a shift reinforced by recent U.S. export controls and rising protectionism across global supply chains.

Industries receiving explicit attention include advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, renewable energy, and agriculture. The plenum emphasized the development of what it termed “new quality productive forces”—a phrase tied to high-tech manufacturing, green energy, and digital infrastructure. It also called for modernization of agriculture and rural revitalization, part of a broader effort to narrow the wealth gap and strengthen domestic demand. The government reiterated that it would “maintain a reasonable proportion of the manufacturing sector,” signaling continued state support for industrial policy despite the drag on consumption and services.

The Party declared that China remains on track to meet its 2025 economic and social targets under the 14th Five-Year Plan, including stable growth, poverty reduction, and incremental progress toward the long-term goal of “socialist modernization” by 2035. While specific GDP growth figures were not released, officials reaffirmed their intent to “firmly accomplish this year’s targets,” an implicit nod to the government’s 2025 growth goal of roughly 5%. To achieve it, Beijing will lean on expanded domestic demand, infrastructure investment, and ongoing stimulus in strategic sectors, though analysts caution that implementation details remain vague. The communique spoke of improving people’s livelihoods and strengthening the social safety net but stopped short of announcing new funding mechanisms or timelines.

Politically, the plenum marked the most significant leadership reshuffle since 2017, coinciding with a sweeping anti-corruption purge across the People’s Liberation Army. Eleven members of the Central Committee were replaced, the largest turnover in nearly a decade. Most notable was the removal of General He Weidong, the former second-ranked vice chair of the Central Military Commission (CMC), who was expelled from the Party on corruption charges along with eight other generals. His dismissal—reportedly the first of a sitting CMC member since the Cultural Revolution—underscores Xi’s tightening control over the military. Veteran General Zhang Shengmin, 67, was promoted to the CMC’s vice chairmanship, signaling continuity in Xi’s anti-graft campaign and consolidation of authority over national defense.

No new political succession plans were discussed publicly, and the communique instead reaffirmed Xi’s central role as the “core” of the Party and the guiding force of “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” This emphasis reflects Xi’s ongoing consolidation of power and the absence of any clear successor—a point that foreign analysts view as evidence that he intends to remain in control well beyond 2030. The plenum also reinforced the ideological importance of Party leadership in all aspects of national governance, with repeated calls to “run the Party well to run the country well.”

Beyond internal politics, the plenum’s tone toward foreign relations was measured but firm. While no major trade breakthroughs were announced, the session reaffirmed Beijing’s commitment to “high-standard opening up” and “mutually beneficial cooperation,” signaling cautious optimism ahead of expected trade discussions with U.S. officials in Malaysia later this week. Chinese leaders framed self-reliance not as isolationism but as a precondition for balanced engagement with the global economy—particularly in advanced technologies where the U.S.–China rivalry is most acute.

The official People’s Daily editorial accompanying the plenum positioned China’s five-year planning system as a pillar of stability amid global uncertainty. It argued that China’s centralized approach allows it to “mobilize all sides and advance steadily in the right direction,” in contrast to what it described as the “short-term policymaking and reversals” of multiparty systems. That ideological framing reinforces Beijing’s view that its governance model—anchored in planning and continuity—remains a competitive advantage even as economic headwinds persist.

In summary, the Fourth Plenum advanced three main themes: strengthening China’s technological self-sufficiency, tightening internal Party control, and preparing for an era of greater economic and geopolitical volatility. The roadmap laid out this week points toward a future of state-led innovation, industrial consolidation, and expanded domestic consumption—goals that align with Xi’s broader ambition of securing China’s ascent to “socialist modernization” by 2035. Yet beneath the confidence lies caution: achieving those objectives will require reconciling the dual imperatives of control and growth in an increasingly uncertain world.