Bitcoin Security Chief Advocates Burning Quantum-Vulnerable Coins

Jameson Lopp, the chief security officer at a Bitcoin custody company, has recently argued against the recovery of lost Bitcoin (BTC) using quantum computers. He believes that burning these coins to protect the integrity of the Bitcoin protocol is the preferable option. Lopp's stance is rooted in the belief that allowing quantum recovery of lost coins would violate the Bitcoin network's properties of censorship resistance, transaction immutability, and conservatism.

In a recent article, Lopp stated that allowing quantum recovery of Bitcoin is akin to wealth redistribution. He argued that this would result in Bitcoin being redistributed from those unaware of quantum computers to those who have acquired the technology. Lopp concluded that quantum recovery can only harm the security of the Bitcoin network, making it a non-viable option.

The debate surrounding the threat posed by quantum computers to Bitcoin continues to be a contentious issue. Some argue that the threat to modern encryption is decades away, while others believe that quantum computers will never be practical. There are also warnings that the threat is imminent, adding to the complexity of the discussion.

Lopp's argument is based on several scenarios that could unfold as quantum computing technology advances. One scenario is that quantum computing never materializes as a threat, making the discussion irrelevant. Another scenario involves a sudden quantum threat that renders Bitcoin's current cryptographic methods obsolete, making it difficult to upgrade the protocol in time. The most likely scenarios, according to Lopp, involve a gradual advancement of quantum computing, allowing the Bitcoin community to implement quantum-resistant signatures before a significant threat materializes.

A central point of contention is whether quantum-vulnerable funds should be left open for anyone with a quantum computer to spend or if they should be permanently locked. Lopp argues that the latter option, which he refers to as "burning" the funds, is the more ethical and practical choice. He posits that allowing quantum computers to access lost funds would result in significant economic disruption and wealth redistribution, benefiting only those with access to quantum technology. This, he argues, would undermine the fundamental principles of Bitcoin, including censorship resistance, forward compatibility, and conservatism.

Lopp also addresses the ethical dilemma of quantifying harm. By making quantum-vulnerable funds unspendable, some users who neglected to migrate their funds to quantum-safe locking scripts would be harmed. However, this harm would be outweighed by the prevention of funds falling into the hands of a few privileged individuals with quantum computers. Lopp uses the example of an individual who accidentally threw away a hard drive containing 8,000 BTC to illustrate the potential harm of allowing quantum recovery. This individual, who has spent a decade trying to retrieve his lost coins, would likely prefer his funds to be permanently frozen rather than fall into someone else's possession.

Lopp's proposal to burn quantum-vulnerable funds would involve a soft fork, where Bitcoin nodes would no longer accept transactions that spend funds from vulnerable scripts. This approach would be objective and neutral, eliminating any subjectivity from the code. Lopp suggests a grace period of at least one year for software wallets to upgrade and at least six months for all users to migrate their funds, excluding dust UTXOs.

In conclusion, Lopp's argument for burning quantum-vulnerable BTC is based on a combination of ethical, practical, and philosophical considerations. He believes that this approach would strengthen Bitcoin's security, prevent significant economic disruption, and uphold the fundamental principles of the network. While the debate is far from settled, Lopp's perspective offers a compelling case for why burning quantum-vulnerable funds may be the best option for the future of Bitcoin.