Assessing the Financial and Geopolitical Risks of Global Health System Fragility: The Case of the 2025 Ebola Outbreak in Congo

The 2025 Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has once again exposed the fragility of global health systems in the face of emerging infectious diseases. With 28 suspected cases and 15 deaths reported in Kasai Province—including four health workers—the outbreak, caused by the Zaire strain, underscores the urgent need for robust pandemic preparedness infrastructure. According to a report by the World Health Organization (WHO), the agency has deployed two tons of protective gear and mobile lab equipment to support containment efforts, yet systemic challenges persist [1]. The outbreak also highlights the financial and geopolitical risks of underinvestment in health systems, particularly in regions like the DRC, where political instability, weak governance, and limited domestic financing compound the challenges of outbreak response [4].

Financial Risks: Funding Gaps and the Limits of Innovation

The DRC’s experience with the 2025 outbreak reflects a broader global crisis in pandemic preparedness financing. The World Bank and WHO estimate that low- and lower-middle-income countries (LMICs) require $31.1 billion annually for pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response (PPPR), yet a $10.5 billion funding gap remains unaddressed [1]. Despite the establishment of the World Bank-administered Pandemic Fund, which has raised only $1.85 billion to date, innovative financing mechanisms such as Advance Market Commitments (AMCs) and pandemic bonds have shown mixed results. A 2025 study in The Lancet found that these tools often suffer from design flaws, lack of transparency, and misalignment with national strategic plans, limiting their scalability and effectiveness [1].

The DRC’s Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement Project (REDISSE IV) offers a counterpoint. This initiative, which has improved diagnostic capacity, water sanitation, and One Health coordination in provinces like Équateur and Kwilu, demonstrates that targeted investments can yield measurable returns. For instance, REDISSE IV’s rehabilitation of provincial laboratories and establishment of emergency stockpiles have enhanced the DRC’s ability to detect and respond to outbreaks [4]. However, such progress is threatened by donor fatigue and the recent US pullback from global health funding, which has already weakened responses to mpox, cholera, and measles in the region [1].

Geopolitical Risks: From Health Crises to Global Instability

The 2025 Ebola outbreak also amplifies geopolitical tensions, particularly in a world increasingly shaped by multipolar power dynamics. The potential for high-consequence pathogens to be weaponized—highlighted by the CBRNe (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive) framework—has shifted pandemic preparedness from a public health issue to a national security priority [5]. In the DRC, where the outbreak coincides with the 2025 Pandemic Accord’s implementation, the fragility of local health systems risks undermining the accord’s goals of equitable response and systemic resilience [4].

Moreover, the economic implications of uncontained outbreaks are profound. A large-scale Ebola resurgence in the DRC could disrupt regional trade, exacerbate food insecurity, and strain international aid flows. The 2018–2020 Ebola outbreak, for example, cost the DRC an estimated $1.2 billion in lost economic activity, according to a 2025 analysis by the World Bank [2]. Such disruptions ripple globally, as seen in the 2020 mpox outbreak, which triggered border closures and supply chain delays across Europe and North America [1].

Investment in Resilience: Lessons from the DRC

The DRC’s experience underscores the need for a dual focus on infrastructure and governance. Strategic Response Plan 4 (SRP 4), implemented during the 2018–2020 Ebola outbreak, demonstrated that integrated, context-specific responses—including community engagement, security coordination, and risk communication—can reduce transmission rates by threefold and accelerate outbreak control [2]. However, these successes depend on sustained funding and political will.

Regional cooperation is equally critical. The Africa CDC’s Africa Epidemic Fund, launched to strengthen domestic resource mobilization, exemplifies how regional actors can fill gaps left by declining foreign aid [3]. Yet, as the DRC’s reliance on external partnerships reveals, power imbalances and misaligned priorities often hinder effective collaboration [4]. To address this, investments must prioritize local scientific evidence, equitable partnerships, and capacity-building in fragile contexts.

Conclusion: A Call for Systemic Resilience

The 2025 Ebola outbreak in the DRC is not an isolated event but a symptom of deeper systemic vulnerabilities. Financially, the world must close the $10.5 billion PPPR funding gap through a mix of traditional aid, innovative financing, and domestic resource mobilization. Geopolitically, the integration of health security into national and international security frameworks is non-negotiable.

For investors and policymakers, the message is clear: pandemic preparedness is not a cost but an investment in stability. The DRC’s progress with REDISSE IV and SRP 4 offers a blueprint, but scaling these efforts requires a commitment to long-term resilience—not reactive band-aids. As the 2025 Pandemic Accord enters its implementation phase, the world must choose between underfunding preparedness and risking another crisis—or investing in a future where health systems are as robust as the economies they serve.

**Source:[1] An appraisal of the use of innovative financing mechanisms,
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11948775/[2] Contrasting the impact and cost-effectiveness,
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12004461/[3] As Foreign Aid Lags, Regional Health Agencies Come to,
https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/foreign-aid-lags-regional-health-agencies-come-fore[4] Democratic Republic of Congo Overview,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview[5] Ebola as a Bioweapon: Rethinking Preparedness in an...,
https://globalbiodefense.com/2025/06/18/ebola-bioweapon-potential-cbrne-strategies-biodefense/