American Express Is Still on Berkshire's Short List-Here's Why Abel Won't Sell It

Berkshire's American Express position is a long-held conviction, not a fresh buy

This is a hold case that goes back years, not a fresh buy call. Berkshire still owns 22% of American Express at a cost basis of just $1.29 billion, worth about $56.1 billion. For observable public-market investors, that is about as much skin in the game as there is. When a position is that large and that cheap, the more relevant question is not whether American Express deserves another compliment. It is whether Berkshire has any reason to part with such a successful concentration.

Abel's first signals point to continuity, not a new strategy

The leadership change needs to be framed correctly. Greg Abel's first shareholder letter stressed a smooth shift from Warren Buffett, a commitment to preserve Berkshire's culture, and Buffett's continued availability as a resource for capital deployment. That matters because a change in CEO does not automatically mean a change in portfolio philosophy.

That backdrop also makes Berkshire's recent weakness more interesting. BRK.B is down 12.4% from that May peak even as the broader market kept setting records. For investors watching American Express specifically, the key question is whether Abel is likely to abandon the kind of concentrated, long-duration holding framework Berkshire has already signaled.

Why American Express still fits Berkshire's concentrated portfolio

Abel is not preserving Berkshire's portfolio out of nostalgia. He is preserving a rule of ownership: own more of the best ideas, not less. Berkshire now has roughly 68% of its portfolio in just five companies after trimming to fewer than 30 holdings. In that framework, American Express still fits if it continues to qualify as a durable business worth carrying at scale.

The few-best-ideas test still looks satisfied

Berkshire is not under pressure to buy more just because it has capital. Sometimes the capital-allocation decision is simply to hold. With American Express, the question is whether the business still deserves concentration, not whether Berkshire needs to average in.

There is at least some evidence that the brand is still broadening its base. In Q2 2026, Gen Z spending grew 40% year over year and millennial spending rose 14%. Separately, Card member rewards spending remained elevated after the revamped Platinum Card launched, which is the kind of product signal investors look for when judging whether a franchise is still gaining traction.

The economics of keeping a winner already in place

The hold case is also simple from an economics standpoint. Berkshire's cost basis was just $1.29 billion, versus a $56.1 billion market value, and the company collected $479 million in dividends last year-meaning dividends alone would take a little less than three years to equal the original cost basis. That does not prove the future case, but it does explain why Berkshire has little incentive to sell purely for the sake of portfolio neatness.

What would actually make Berkshire sell American Express?

The real signal is not short-term price action or quarterly noise. It is whether Abel decides the long-term economic case for concentration has weakened. His standard is explicit: expect concentration in American Express to continue with limited activity unless Berkshire sees "fundamental changes in long-term economic prospects". That remains a high bar.

The practical watchpoints

If the thesis were to weaken, the evidence would likely show up in a few places: - a clear break in American Express's long-term economic prospects - softer spending momentum among younger generations - weaker traction for the revamped Platinum Card

Until something like that appears, Berkshire's most credible signal is still continuity. That means American Express is likely to remain one of the positions on Berkshire's short list because, so far, there has been no confirmed reason for Abel to change course.