Airbus's Delivery Reliance on CFM Engine Output: A Critical Bottleneck for 2025 Growth

Airbus's 2025 growth ambitions hang in the balance as its reliance on CFM International for engine supply intensifies supply chain risks. Despite reaffirming a target of 820 commercial aircraft deliveries for the year, the European manufacturer faces mounting challenges from bottlenecks in CFM's LEAP engine production. As of mid-2025, Airbus has 60 completed aircraft—fully assembled but lacking engines—waiting to be delivered, up from 40 in June and 17 in April. These “gliders” underscore a systemic issue: CFM's ability to scale production and address maintenance backlogs will determine whether Airbus can meet its delivery goals.

CFM's Production Constraints and Maintenance Challenges

CFM International, a joint venture between GE Aerospace and Safran, plans to boost LEAP engine production by 15–20% in 2025 compared to 2024 levels, aiming for 1,618–1,688 units. However, supply chain disruptions and technical issues, such as fuel nozzle durability problems in the LEAP-1A engine, have strained its capacity. These challenges are compounded by CFM's dual obligations to Airbus and Boeing, which competes for its limited output. According to a report by Reuters, Airbus CEO Guillaume Faury has acknowledged that engine shortages are forcing the company to “backload” deliveries, requiring an unsustainable pace of 86 aircraft per month in the second half of 2025 to hit the 820-target.

The financial toll is evident. Airbus reported a €1.6 billion cash outflow in the first half of 2025, partly due to the accumulation of work-in-progress (WIP) aircraft awaiting engines. This cash burn reflects the cost of maintaining high production rates while managing inventory and supplier dependencies.

Structural Dependency and Strategic Risks

Airbus's reliance on CFM is not merely operational but structural. The joint venture controls approximately 60% of A320neo engine supply, with stalled negotiations to increase this share to 75% due to CFM's commitments to Boeing's 733 MAX program. Moreover, CFM's dominance extends to the maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) ecosystem for LEAP engines, creating a dual bottleneck in both production and post-sale support.

This dependency is exacerbated by historical industry dynamics. CFM's strategic control over specialized assets and its entrenched position in the MRO market have made it a critical partner for Airbus. Yet, as Finimize notes, this concentration of power leaves Airbus vulnerable to CFM's production constraints and technical delays. The situation mirrors broader industry trends, such as COMAC's struggles with CFM-supplied engines for its C919 jet, highlighting the global risks of over-reliance on a single supplier.

Mitigation Strategies and Uncertain Outlook

Airbus has explored mitigation strategies, including extending the lifecycle of existing engine components and recycling materials like titanium. A study in ScienceDirect suggests that lifetime extension strategies could offset more than 10% of required material inputs, though these measures remain supplementary to new production. However, such approaches do not address the root issue: CFM's capacity to scale output and resolve technical flaws in its engines.

The company's optimism hinges on CFM's ability to deliver on its 2025 production targets. Yet, as of July 2025, it remains unclear whether the 15–20% increase will suffice to clear the backlog. Investors must weigh Airbus's confidence in supplier commitments against the reality of supply chain fragility.

Conclusion

Airbus's 2025 growth trajectory is inextricably linked to CFM's performance. While the company's delivery target remains unchanged, the risks of supply chain bottlenecks and maintenance delays cannot be overstated. For investors, the key question is whether CFM can overcome its constraints—or whether Airbus will need to diversify its engine supply chain to avoid future disruptions. Until then, the European aerospace giant's success in 2025 will depend not only on its own production capabilities but on the resilience of a single, overburdened supplier.