El límite del 10% en las tasas de tarjetas de crédito impuesto por Trump: una amenaza estructural para la reserva de beneficios de 130 mil millones de dólares.

The proposal to cap credit card rates at 10% is not a minor policy tweak. It targets a colossal, and highly profitable, segment of the U.S. financial system. The sheer scale of the underlying market sets the stakes. As of the third quarter of 2025, Americans carried a total of $1.233 trillion in credit card debt. That figure represents a record high, having climbed by hundreds of billions since the pandemic lows. This mountain of debt is the fuel for the industry's engine.

The engine runs on interest. The average credit card rate currently sits at 19.65%, a slight retreat from a recent peak but still firmly in the double digits. This is the price paid for unsecured borrowing, and it is the primary source of revenue for issuers. The profitability is staggering. Industry estimates point to annual profits in the range of $130 billion. That is a dedicated profit pool, directly tied to the interest rates charged on that massive debt.

The rationale for the proposal is straightforward and populist. President Trump, echoing a campaign promise, frames it as a fight against "ripped off" consumers, targeting the high rates that have "festered" under previous administrations. The idea has drawn surprising bipartisan legislative support, with bills introduced by figures from both parties. Yet the legal path is fraught with ambiguity. The president has not detailed how he would enact a one-year cap, and the authority to unilaterally impose such a sweeping rate control is highly questionable. It would likely require either a new law or a complex regulatory maneuver, neither of which is guaranteed.

The bottom line is structural. A policy that caps rates at 10% would directly attack the core revenue stream of the credit card industry. With debt levels at record highs and interest rates still near 20%, the potential for a $130 billion profit pool to be materially compressed is real. This is not a theoretical risk; it is the direct consequence of a proposal that seeks to halve the effective cost of borrowing for hundreds of millions of Americans.

The Structural Shift: Forcing a Repricing of Risk

The proposed 10% cap represents a direct assault on the industry's fundamental pricing model. The math is stark: a reduction from an average rate of 19.65% to 10% amounts to roughly a 50% cut in the primary revenue stream. This compression hits the core profit margin, which typically sits between 12 and 13 percentage points above the Prime Rate. In essence, the policy would halve the markup that has long justified the high cost of unsecured credit.

The industry's warning is that this forced repricing would have cascading effects. Major banking groups have issued a joint statement cautioning that a 10% cap would reduce credit availability and be "devastating" for families and small businesses. Their argument is that with interest income slashed, issuers would either tighten lending standards dramatically or exit the market altogether for certain segments. This, they claim, would drive consumers toward less regulated and more costly alternatives like payday loans or pawn shops, ultimately harming the very people the policy aims to help.

Yet a counterpoint from a separate analysis challenges this dire picture. A study by the Vanderbilt Policy Accelerator suggests that even a substantial rate cut would only impact what it terms "excessive" profit margins. The analysis contends that the industry's profitability is so high that it could absorb a rate reduction, save billions for consumers, and still maintain profits, without significantly impeding access to credit or popular rewards programs. This creates a central tension: one view sees a structural shock to credit availability, while the other sees a manageable adjustment within an already lucrative market.

Viewed through a macro lens, the proposal forces a structural shift in the credit ecosystem. It compels issuers to fundamentally re-evaluate risk assessment and customer segmentation. With the traditional high-margin model under threat, the incentive to lend to the most profitable, low-risk customers may intensify, while the appetite for higher-risk borrowers could diminish. The policy, in effect, seeks to transfer a massive profit pool from financial institutions to consumers, but the mechanism for that transfer-whether through reduced credit access or a recalibrated risk-reward calculus-will define the new landscape.

The Bipartisan Legislative Reality Check

The proposal's path to implementation faces a stark reality check. While President Trump's recent social media announcement frames a one-year cap as an executive action, the legal and political machinery required is far more complex. The administration's own actions have created a vacuum, while a bipartisan legislative solution already exists but remains stalled.

The most direct legislative route is a bill introduced last year by Senators Bernie Sanders and Josh Hawley. S.381, the 10 Percent Credit Card Interest Rate Cap Act, would impose a five-year limit on rates, sunsetting in 2031. This bipartisan framework provides a clear blueprint, yet it has not moved forward. The administration's posture has been a key obstacle. Officials have actively rolled back consumer protections, most notably by killing a Biden-era rule that would have capped credit card late fees at $8. This pattern of deregulation, rather than support, for consumer financial rules undermines the political will needed to pass new, restrictive legislation.

The pressure on the primary regulator, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), is central to this dynamic. The administration has sought to dismantle the agency, with its acting director halting bank exams and lawsuits, and openly advocating for its elimination within the next few months. This creates a regulatory vacuum. Without a robust, independent agency to propose and enforce rules, the mechanism for a unilateral rate cap is absent. The CFPB is the body that would typically be tasked with such rulemaking, but its weakening signals a fundamental shift in philosophy toward less oversight.

The bottom line is a policy caught between a legislative logjam and a regulatory collapse. The bipartisan bill offers a viable path, but without White House support, it lacks momentum. Meanwhile, the administration's actions have gutted the very institution that could implement a cap via regulation. For the 10% rate limit to become law, it would require a significant reversal of this deregulatory trend and a new wave of political capital from the president. Given the current trajectory, that seems unlikely. The proposal remains a powerful political statement, but its practical feasibility is constrained by the very forces it seeks to harness.

Catalysts, Scenarios, and What to Watch

The path from political announcement to financial reality is narrow and fraught with uncertainty. For investors, the key will be monitoring a handful of concrete catalysts that will determine whether this proposal becomes a material shock or fades as a political footnote. The outcome hinges on the interplay between executive action, legislative momentum, and the industry's preemptive response.

The most immediate signal to watch is any formal regulatory action from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The administration's recent announcement of plans to issue an executive order imposing a temporary 10% cap is a clear, if legally dubious, step. However, the CFPB's capacity to act is severely compromised. The agency's acting director has requested funds for the agency just days after the announcement, highlighting its weakened state. A credible attempt to implement the cap would require the CFPB to not only draft a rule but also defend it against legal challenges. The absence of a robust, independent agency is a major friction point. Any rulemaking proceeding would be a critical indicator of seriousness, but its likelihood is low given the administration's own stated desire to dismantle the bureau.

Parallel to this regulatory uncertainty is the stalled legislative track. The bipartisan S.381 bill, which would impose a five-year cap, provides a clearer legal path. Yet it has not advanced. Congressional action would be the most durable route, but it requires a reversal of the administration's deregulatory posture and a significant shift in political capital. The industry's joint warning, stating that a 10% cap would reduce credit availability, is a direct appeal to lawmakers' concerns about economic stability. Watch for any hearings, amendments, or votes on this or similar bills as a sign of legislative viability.

In the meantime, the market's first reaction will be to the industry's balance sheet management. Issuers have a powerful incentive to prepare for a lower-rate environment. The coming earnings reports will be a litmus test. Look for signs of proactive risk mitigation: increased use of risk-based pricing to protect margins, a slowdown in new card issuance, or a strategic shift toward lower-risk customer segments. These moves would signal that the industry is treating the threat as real, not rhetorical. Any such adjustments would compress near-term profitability and credit growth, even before a cap is formally enacted.

The range of possible outcomes is wide. A best-case scenario for the administration is a symbolic executive order that draws attention but faces swift legal challenges and is overturned, leaving the status quo intact. A worst-case scenario for the industry is a swift legislative victory, followed by a CFPB rule that forces a rapid repricing of credit. The most likely middle ground is a prolonged political and legal battle, with the policy remaining in a state of limbo for months or years. In that scenario, the industry's preemptive balance sheet adjustments would become the primary financial impact, as the threat of a cap reshapes lending behavior and profitability in anticipation of the worst. The catalysts are clear; the timing and outcome remain the central uncertainty.