Fed's Powell: Independence from Politics Crucial for Economic Goals
Generado por agente de IACharles Hayes
miércoles, 29 de enero de 2025, 6:20 pm ET2 min de lectura
ANNA--
Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell reaffirmed the central bank's commitment to achieving its mandated goals of maximum employment and stable prices, emphasizing the importance of independence from political interference. Speaking at the New York Times' DealBook summit, Powell addressed concerns about President-elect Donald Trump's public criticisms of the Fed and his insistence on having a "say" in the Fed's interest rate policies.
Powell stated, "We’re supposed to achieve maximum employment and price stability for the benefit of all Americans and keep out of politics completely." He expressed confidence in the broad support for the Fed's independence in Congress, noting, "There’s very, very broad support for that set of ideas in Congress, in both political parties, on both sides of the Hill."

The Fed's independence enables it to take necessary measures to restore price stability, even when those measures may not be popular in the short term. For instance, during the recent period of high inflation, the Fed raised interest rates to slow the economy and ease inflationary pressures. This action, while unpopular in the short term, was necessary to achieve the Fed's goal of stable prices (Powell, 2023).
Moreover, the Fed's independence allows it to maintain a consistent monetary policy strategy, even as political winds may shift. This consistency is essential for the Fed to achieve its goals, as it allows businesses and households to make long-term plans based on predictable monetary policy (Alesina & Summers, 1993).
Powell also addressed the topic of climate change, noting that while the Fed has narrow responsibilities regarding climate-related financial risks, it should not use its monetary policy or supervisory tools to promote a greener economy or achieve other climate-based goals without explicit congressional legislation. He stated, "Without explicit congressional legislation, it would be inappropriate for us to use our monetary policy or supervisory tools to promote a greener economy or to achieve other climate-based goals" (Powell, 2024).
In conclusion, the Federal Reserve's independence from political interference is vital for its ability to achieve its mandated goals of maximum employment and stable prices. This independence enables the Fed to make decisions that prioritize the long-term interests of the American public, take necessary measures to restore price stability, and maintain a consistent monetary policy strategy. By sticking to its knitting and focusing on its statutory goals, the Fed can effectively serve the public and maintain public trust in its decision-making process.
References:
Alesina, Alberto, & Summers, Lawrence H. (1993). Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25(5), 151-162.
Bernanke, Ben S. (2010). Central Bank Independence, Transparency, and Accountability. Speech delivered at the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies International Conference, Bank of Japan, Tokyo, Japan, May 25.
Powell, Jerome H. (2023). The Rise and Fall of Inflation. Speech delivered at the Economic Club of New York, New York, NY, January 30.
Powell, Jerome H. (2024). Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell Speaks at the New York Times’ DealBook Summit. Speech delivered at the New York Times’ DealBook Summit, New York, NY, December 4.
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Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell reaffirmed the central bank's commitment to achieving its mandated goals of maximum employment and stable prices, emphasizing the importance of independence from political interference. Speaking at the New York Times' DealBook summit, Powell addressed concerns about President-elect Donald Trump's public criticisms of the Fed and his insistence on having a "say" in the Fed's interest rate policies.
Powell stated, "We’re supposed to achieve maximum employment and price stability for the benefit of all Americans and keep out of politics completely." He expressed confidence in the broad support for the Fed's independence in Congress, noting, "There’s very, very broad support for that set of ideas in Congress, in both political parties, on both sides of the Hill."

The Fed's independence enables it to take necessary measures to restore price stability, even when those measures may not be popular in the short term. For instance, during the recent period of high inflation, the Fed raised interest rates to slow the economy and ease inflationary pressures. This action, while unpopular in the short term, was necessary to achieve the Fed's goal of stable prices (Powell, 2023).
Moreover, the Fed's independence allows it to maintain a consistent monetary policy strategy, even as political winds may shift. This consistency is essential for the Fed to achieve its goals, as it allows businesses and households to make long-term plans based on predictable monetary policy (Alesina & Summers, 1993).
Powell also addressed the topic of climate change, noting that while the Fed has narrow responsibilities regarding climate-related financial risks, it should not use its monetary policy or supervisory tools to promote a greener economy or achieve other climate-based goals without explicit congressional legislation. He stated, "Without explicit congressional legislation, it would be inappropriate for us to use our monetary policy or supervisory tools to promote a greener economy or to achieve other climate-based goals" (Powell, 2024).
In conclusion, the Federal Reserve's independence from political interference is vital for its ability to achieve its mandated goals of maximum employment and stable prices. This independence enables the Fed to make decisions that prioritize the long-term interests of the American public, take necessary measures to restore price stability, and maintain a consistent monetary policy strategy. By sticking to its knitting and focusing on its statutory goals, the Fed can effectively serve the public and maintain public trust in its decision-making process.
References:
Alesina, Alberto, & Summers, Lawrence H. (1993). Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25(5), 151-162.
Bernanke, Ben S. (2010). Central Bank Independence, Transparency, and Accountability. Speech delivered at the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies International Conference, Bank of Japan, Tokyo, Japan, May 25.
Powell, Jerome H. (2023). The Rise and Fall of Inflation. Speech delivered at the Economic Club of New York, New York, NY, January 30.
Powell, Jerome H. (2024). Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell Speaks at the New York Times’ DealBook Summit. Speech delivered at the New York Times’ DealBook Summit, New York, NY, December 4.
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