El modelo de tesoro de Bitcoin en un momento de crisis: El fin de la era de los precios elevados

The structural model that powered the 2025 boom is now in full retreat. The era of easy capital raises and expanding premiums has ended, replaced by a harsh reality where nearly 40% of the sector's major players trade for less than the Bitcoin on their balance sheets. According to data, at least 37 of the top 100 Bitcoin treasury companies now trade at discounts to their net asset value, a figure that underscores the scale of the collapse.

This wasn't a random stumble; it was the failure of a carefully engineered cycle. In the premium era, companies raised capital at prices above their Bitcoin holdings. The proceeds were then used to buy more crypto, which in turn justified a higher valuation and fueled the next round of capital raising. It was a self-reinforcing loop that drove the sector's explosive growth, with nearly 200 public firms amassing over 1 million Bitcoin worth around $96 billion. The playbook worked only as long as the premium persisted.

That cycle is now broken. The mechanism has inverted. Evidence shows that more than 60% of Bitcoin treasuries bought Bitcoin at a price well above its current level. This creates a fundamental vulnerability: their balance sheets are marked down, and their stock prices reflect that loss. When a company's equity trades below the value of its underlying crypto, the capital-raising engine dies. As macro analyst Alex Kruger put it, companies trading below NAV cannot raise capital without destroying shareholder value. The model has collapsed from a growth machine into a discount reality.

The Strategic Imperative for Survival

The collapse of the premium model has created a stark new reality. For the vast majority of Bitcoin treasury companies, simply holding crypto is no longer a business. As Mike Novogratz, CEO of Galaxy Digital, stated bluntly on a recent podcast, "You're not going to get shareholder value just by owning the underlying [asset]". The days of diluting shareholders to buy more Bitcoin and calling it a strategy are over. The structural headwinds are now undeniable, with nearly 40% of the sector trading at a discount to their net asset value and more than 60% having bought their core holdings at prices well above today's levels.

This sets up a clear divide. The model that once seemed replicable has proven to be the exception, not the rule. Novogratz pointedly noted that only Strategy, BitMine, and to some extent Joe Lubin's firm succeeded. He estimated that "three out of 50" treasury companies executed the scheme successfully. The rest are left with a costly asset base and no path to value creation. The few pioneers managed to build something real-Strategy with its corporate treasury play, BitMine with its focused Ethereum accumulation and distribution. For everyone else, the playbook is closed.

The path forward is a simple, brutal imperative: transform or die. Management teams must now convert their treasury capital into new ventures with tangible revenue models. Novogratz's prescription is to look at the firm's existing assets and ask, "Hey, let's create a neobank. Let's create something with this capital". The goal is to abandon the pure-play treasury marketing ploy and become a conventional business. This could mean launching financial services, building infrastructure, or developing products that leverage the company's crypto holdings and expertise. The alternative is a slow death as discount vehicles, trading at 70 to 80 cents on the dollar, with no mechanism to rebuild shareholder value.

The bottom line is that the era of easy money is finished. Survival now depends entirely on execution. Companies must leverage their balance sheets not to buy more crypto, but to build something new. As Novogratz admitted, "I think we all got caught up in a bit of a hype trade". The next phase is about getting out of that trade by getting into real business.

Financial and Market Implications

The defunct premium model has triggered a cascade of financial and market consequences. The most immediate is a severe funding constraint. When a company trades below its net asset value, raising equity capital becomes a destructive act. As macro analyst Alex Kruger noted, companies trading below 1.0x mNAV cannot issue stock to buy more Bitcoin because doing so destroys shareholder value. This dynamic has effectively closed the capital markets to the vast majority of the sector, ending the self-reinforcing cycle of dilution and accumulation that powered the boom.

This has also brought an end to the speculative shopping spree for Ethereum treasuries. The model that once justified buying at any price is dead. Ethereum treasuries have also all but ended their shopping sprees. Only Tom Lee's BitMine continues to buy Ether weekly, having amassed over half of all Ether held in the sector. The rest are left holding depreciated assets with no viable path to recapitalization through further purchases.

The broader market dynamic has shifted from a story of asset accumulation to one of operational strategy. The sector's valuation is now a function of company-specific fundamentals, not just crypto holdings. As Mike Novogratz stated, "You're not going to get shareholder value just by owning the underlying [asset]". The collapse of the premium has forced a reckoning where the only path to value creation is transformation into a conventional business with a revenue model. This makes company-specific execution, management skill, and strategic clarity paramount. The era of easy money is finished; the new reality is one where survival depends entirely on building something real.

Catalysts and Risks Ahead

The sector's final test is now underway. The collapse of the premium model has stripped away the easy path, leaving only one viable catalyst for survival: the pace and success of strategic pivots into new businesses. This is no longer a theoretical exercise. As Mike Novogratz has made clear, the mandate is to convert [treasuries] into companies with tangible products and services. The coming quarters will be decisive, as management teams must leverage their existing capital and crypto holdings to build revenue-generating operations. The few pioneers who succeeded-Strategy, BitMine, and Joe Lubin's firm-did so by creating something real. The rest must follow suit, or face a slow death as discount vehicles.

The primary risk is that companies cannot demonstrate credible value creation beyond simply holding assets. This is the core vulnerability. When a firm trades at a discount to its net asset value, its balance sheet is already marked down. If its new ventures fail to generate profits or show a clear path to them, the discount will deepen. The market will have no reason to pay a premium for a business that is merely a wrapper for depreciated crypto. As macro analyst Alex Kruger noted, the model is an abomination that destroys shareholder value when dilution is attempted. The risk is that many companies will attempt to repackage the same failed strategy under a new name, leading to further erosion of capital and investor confidence.

Watch for two external factors that could tip the balance. First, regulatory clarity on new financial services ventures will be critical. Launching a neobank or crypto infrastructure product requires navigating a complex and evolving legal landscape. Uncertainty here could delay or derail promising pivots. Second, broader market sentiment shifts will impact the viability of these new businesses. A resurgence in risk appetite could provide a tailwind for innovative fintech plays, while a continued bear market would make fundraising and customer acquisition far more difficult.

The bottom line is that the Bitcoin treasury space is entering a Darwinian phase. The era of easy money is over. The survivors will be determined not by their crypto holdings, but by their ability to execute a transformation into conventional businesses. The catalyst is clear, the risk is structural, and the market will judge them on their actions, not their balance sheets.