Evaluación de la viabilidad de la inversión en petróleo en Venezuela después de Maduro

The removal of Nicolás Maduro from power in early 2026 has reignited global interest in Venezuela's oil sector, a critical asset for both the country's economic recovery and U.S. strategic energy ambitions. However, the feasibility of U.S. oil investment in post-Maduro Venezuela hinges on two pivotal factors: geopolitical risk and legal framework reform. These elements act as gatekeepers to profitability, determining whether foreign capital can navigate the complex interplay of political instability, sanctions, and institutional uncertainty.

Geopolitical Risk: A Double-Edged Sword

The U.S. military intervention that removed Maduro has created a fragile political landscape. While the Trump administration has positioned itself as a temporary steward of Venezuela's oil sector, the transition has not led to a clear democratic mandate. Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, a former vice president and key figure in the Chavista regime, has retained control, raising concerns about the persistence of authoritarian structures. Hardline elements within the military and state apparatus remain entrenched, complicating efforts to dismantle the legacy of chavismo.

This instability introduces significant geopolitical risk. U.S. policymakers must balance the need to incentivize foreign investment with the imperative to maintain leverage over the interim regime. For instance, the selective rollback of sanctions-while intended to facilitate oil exports and infrastructure investment-remains conditional on Venezuela's alignment with U.S. interests, such as severing ties with China, Russia, and Cuba. However, the history of U.S. sanctions being rescinded under shifting political dynamics creates uncertainty for investors, who require long-term stability to justify capital-intensive projects.

Moreover, the U.S. strategy of managing Venezuela's crude oil reserves-selling proceeds into U.S. government accounts-introduces an additional layer of complexity. While this approach aims to ensure transparency and eventual benefits for the Venezuelan people, it also raises questions about the long-term governance of the oil sector.

Legal Framework Reform: A Pathway to Investor Confidence

Venezuela's oil sector has long been governed by a restrictive legal framework that prioritizes state control. The Organic Hydrocarbons Law (OHL) limits foreign investment to joint ventures (Empresas Mixtas) where the state holds a majority stake, while the Anti-Blockade Law allows for production-sharing contracts (CPPs) to circumvent sanctions according to legal analysis. However, these mechanisms remain constrained by Venezuela's denunciation of the ICSID Convention and its termination of the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the Netherlands, which historically provided avenues for dispute resolution as legal experts note.

Post-Maduro reforms must address these legal barriers to attract U.S. and international oil companies (IOCs). The Trump administration has signaled a willingness to facilitate new contracts, including joint ventures where PDVSA holds a minority stake. Yet, the absence of a clear legal framework for governance and the persistence of authoritarian practices-such as the use of "forced absence" to justify Rodríguez's interim role-undermine investor confidence.

A critical challenge lies in reconciling Venezuela's historical pattern of expropriation with the need for stable, enforceable contracts. For example, Chevron, the only major U.S. company currently licensed to operate in Venezuela, has maintained a presence through special OFAC licenses. However, other firms, like ConocoPhillips, have outstanding arbitration claims for seized assets, highlighting the risks of re-entry. To attract sustained investment, Venezuela must offer clarity on revenue-sharing terms, profitability models, and contract enforcement- elements that remain undefined in the post-Maduro transition.

Economic Realities: Infrastructure and Investment Requirements

Even with favorable legal and political conditions, the economic feasibility of U.S. oil investment depends on the scale of infrastructure rehabilitation. Venezuela's oil production has plummeted to less than 1 million barrels per day, a fraction of its 1974 peak of 3.75 million barrels. Rebuilding production to even half of historical levels would require an estimated $15–20 billion in investment to modernize aging facilities, upgrade technology, and address pipeline and power grid dependencies.

The U.S. Department of Energy has authorized the import of oilfield equipment and services to facilitate this recovery according to legal analysis, but the global oversupply of oil and the low price of heavy, sour crude-Venezuela's primary export- pose additional challenges. Moreover, the Trump administration's call for repayment of losses from past nationalizations could delay or complicate investment timelines.

Conclusion: A Calculated Gamble

The post-Maduro transition presents a paradox for U.S. oil investors: a strategic opportunity to access the world's largest oil reserves, coupled with profound risks stemming from political instability, legal uncertainty, and geopolitical competition. While the U.S. has demonstrated a commitment to reshaping Venezuela's energy landscape, the durability of sanctions relief, the stability of the interim regime, and the clarity of legal reforms will determine whether this gamble pays off.

For now, the oil sector remains a high-stakes arena where profitability is contingent on navigating a labyrinth of geopolitical and legal gatekeepers. Investors must weigh the potential rewards of Venezuela's vast reserves against the realities of a fragile transition-one where the line between opportunity and volatility is perilously thin.