Evaluación del límite del 10% en las tarifas de tarjetas de crédito: una perspectiva histórica para Visa y Mastercard

The proposed 10% credit card rate cap is framed as a targeted, temporary intervention. President Trump announced a one-year executive order earlier this week, aiming for it to take effect on January 20, 2026 the one year anniversary of the historic and very successful Trump Administration. This contrasts with a separate bipartisan bill introduced in February 2025 that would have set a five-year cap for the next five years. The key distinction is the sunset clause: the legislative version explicitly sunset on January 1, 2031. This temporary nature is crucial; it signals a policy aimed at immediate relief rather than a permanent overhaul of the credit market.

Historically, such targeted rate caps have proven double-edged. The most relevant precedent is the wave of usury rate laws enacted in the 1970s. While intended to protect consumers, these measures often reduce credit availability and can push borrowers toward less regulated, and typically costlier, alternatives like payday loans or pawn shops. The banking industry has echoed this warning, stating that a 10% cap would be devastating for millions of American families and small business owners who rely on credit cards, arguing it would drive them toward more expensive options. The lesson from the past is that capping rates can squeeze the supply side of credit, potentially harming the very consumers the policy seeks to help.

The cap's success, therefore, hinges on enforcement and market adaptation, not on destroying the underlying value of payment networks. Visa and Mastercard's business models are built on facilitating transactions and managing risk, not on setting the interest rates charged by issuing banks. The policy's impact will be felt through changes in how banks price credit and manage their portfolios, a dynamic that history suggests can be volatile.

The Payment Network Business Model: A Structural Defense

The proposed rate cap is a direct assault on banks, not on the payment networks themselves. Visa and Mastercard operate on a fundamentally different economic model. They do not lend money or charge interest to cardholders. Instead, their revenue comes from fees paid by merchants for the privilege of accepting cards. This is the interchange fee, a small percentage of each transaction that flows from the merchant's acquirer to the card issuer. The network companies set these rates, but they are not the ones taking on the credit risk or setting the APRs that would be capped.

This structural separation is the core defense. Last fiscal year, Visa's net revenue grew 11% year over year to $40 billion, driven entirely by the volume of transactions processed. That growth was fueled by healthy consumer spending, not by interest rate spreads. The same dynamic applies to Mastercard, where value-added services are accelerating growth. Their business is about facilitating commerce, not financing it.

The industry's warning-that a cap would reduce credit availability-highlights the policy's intended target. If banks are forced to cut rates, they may pull back on issuing cards or tighten credit lines, which would directly impact transaction volume. In that scenario, the payment networks would see their fee base shrink. But the risk is indirect. The networks facilitate transactions regardless of the underlying credit terms. As long as merchants continue to accept cards and consumers continue to spend, the interchange fee model remains intact. The cap may squeeze the banks that issue cards, but it does not change the basic math of how Visa and Mastercard earn their fees.

Financial Impact and Valuation Scenarios

The primary financial risk to Visa and Mastercard is indirect. A 10% rate cap would squeeze bank profitability, potentially leading issuers to demand lower interchange fees to offset losses. Mastercard's own documentation underscores the delicate balance here: interchange rates are set to maximize the value of the Mastercard system by balancing issuer and merchant interests. If banks push back, networks could face pressure to adjust rates, but their pricing power and the essential role of their networks provide a buffer. The model is resilient because the networks are not the ones taking on credit risk.

Both companies trade at elevated valuations, reflecting high expectations for growth and stability. Mastercard recently outperformed the market, with shares advancing 7.6% over the past month as capital rotated away from AI-driven stocks. This rotation highlights a broader market shift toward durable, cash-generative models like payment networks. Mastercard trades at a forward earnings multiple of 30.36X, above its industry average, while Visa trades at roughly 26.53X. The key risk to these valuations is not a direct hit to network fees, but a shift in the competitive landscape or merchant pricing dynamics that could undermine the overall transaction ecosystem.

The bottom line is one of structural defense. The payment networks' business is built on facilitating commerce, not financing it. As long as consumers spend and merchants accept cards, the core fee model holds. The cap may force banks to reprice credit, but it does not change the fundamental equation for Visa and Mastercard. Their diverse revenue streams, particularly the accelerating growth in value-added services, further insulate them from any single point of pressure. The networks are positioned to weather the storm, even if the banks issuing cards feel the full brunt.

Catalysts and Watchpoints

The thesis that Visa and Mastercard are structurally insulated from a 10% rate cap hinges on a few specific, near-term events and metrics. The immediate catalyst is the method and timeline for implementation. President Trump announced the cap via social media, with an effective date of January 20, 2026, but provided no details on enforcement or how the government would implement it. This creates a critical uncertainty. If the administration uses an executive order, it may be challenged in court and could face significant pushback from banking groups. The alternative-a legislative cap, like the bipartisan bill introduced in February 2025-would be more durable but faces a tough path through Congress. Investors must watch for the official regulatory framework, as the method will shape the policy's credibility and the speed of market adaptation.

The most direct threat to the networks' fee model would be any proposed legislation that targets interchange fees themselves. While the current cap focuses on APRs, a broader legislative assault could pressure the networks to lower the fees they charge merchants. That would be a more fundamental challenge to their revenue stream. For now, the primary watchpoint is transaction growth and interchange fee stability in the coming quarters. If banks, squeezed by lower interest income, demand lower interchange rates to maintain profitability, the networks' pricing power will be tested. Monitor for any shifts in the competitive landscape or merchant pricing dynamics that could undermine the overall transaction ecosystem.

The bottom line is one of resilience, but it is not passive. The networks' defense depends on the market adapting without a collapse in transaction volume. Watch for signs that banks are pulling back on credit issuance or tightening lines, which would be an early indicator of reduced credit availability. Conversely, if transaction growth remains healthy and interchange fees hold steady, it will validate the thesis that the payment network model can absorb pressure from the banking sector. The catalysts are political and regulatory; the watchpoints are financial and operational.