10 AM: ¿Choque en la Corte Suprema? Las tarifas impuestas por Trump siguen siendo un factor importante… (Y también las tasas de los bonos).

Markets have circled Friday on the calendar because it’s one of those rare “two clocks” sessions: the economic clock (jobs) and the legal clock (Supreme Court) can both reset expectations in real time. The Supreme Court has designated Friday as an opinion day, and on opinion days the justices take the bench at 10:00 a.m. ET, which is the first window when rulings can drop. In practice, that means the market’s “headline risk window” is roughly 10:00–11:00 a.m. ET (and occasionally later if multiple opinions are released or coverage filters out slowly), but 10:00 a.m. is the key starting gun.

The core expectations going into the IEEPA decision is straightforward: investors are leaning toward the Court striking down (or sharply limiting) the administration’s use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 to impose sweeping tariffs without Congress. Reuters notes that justices across the ideological spectrum expressed doubts during oral arguments, and the case is widely viewed as a major test of presidential power. Prediction markets are telling a similar story (low probability of a full “upheld” outcome), and stock price action has reflected that consensus—particularly in tariff-sensitive consumer and retail names that have quietly been trading as if relief is more likely than not.

That said, the base case is not necessarily a clean, cinematic “tariffs: illegal, the end.” A meaningful risk is a narrow or “mishmash” ruling that trims the scope (or the process) without producing immediate clarity on unwind mechanics, refund obligations, or how quickly the executive branch can pivot to other tariff authorities. This is exactly why markets may be pricing the direction correctly but still underpricing the plumbing: what happens to cash, timing, and enforcement. Even if the Court strikes the IEEPA framework, the administration could move quickly under other trade statutes.

If IEEPA gets rolled back, the obvious next question is: what tools does the White House still have? Quite a few—just fewer that are both broad and instantaneous.

Section 232 (Trade Expansion Act of 1962): allows tariffs tied to national security after a Commerce Department investigation. It’s powerful, but it’s inherently more sector-specific (steel, autos, semiconductors, etc.) and procedurally heavier than IEEPA.

Section 301 (Trade Act of 1974): allows tariffs aimed at unfair foreign trade practices after a USTR investigation. It’s typically country- and practice-specific rather than “everyone gets a surcharge.”

Section 122 (Trade Act of 1974): permits a temporary import surcharge or quotas to address serious balance-of-payments issues, but it’s capped (commonly referenced as up to 15%) and time-limited (often cited as up to 150 days), which makes it more of a bridge than a permanent tariff regime.

Section 338 (Tariff Act of 1930): a rarely used “retaliation for discrimination” tool that can, on paper, allow substantial duties on imports from countries that discriminate against U.S. commerce. The lack of modern precedent is the feature and the bug: it’s legally available, but it invites litigation and uncertainty.

Standard trade remedies: anti-dumping and countervailing duties, plus safeguard-style tools in targeted circumstances. These are slower and more technical, but they can still meaningfully raise effective tariff burdens in specific categories.

The net is that “tariffs go away” is not the same thing as “tariffs are gone.” If IEEPA is struck down, the administration can still reconstitute a meaningful tariff footprint—just through narrower channels that are harder to deploy as a single, universal negotiating lever.

So, who benefits most if the IEEPA tariffs are rolled back?

The biggest relative winners tend to be the sectors that (a) import a lot of finished goods, (b) run high inventory turnover, and (c) have limited ability to pass cost shocks through without demand damage.

Retail and consumer discretionary sit at the top of that list. If tariffs come off, it relieves input costs, reduces pricing pressure, and potentially improves gross margins or promotional flexibility. That’s why investors have treated certain large retailers as “quiet beneficiaries” in the run-up, with price action implying a market expectation that the Court clips the tariff regime. Consumer staples can also benefit, especially where packaging and commodity-linked inputs (think metals like aluminum) were pushed higher by tariff-induced supply-chain friction.

Industrials with import-heavy components and complex supply chains can also see a meaningful tailwind, particularly where contracts were written assuming the tariff regime stays in place. Autos and auto parts are a second-order beneficiary for similar reasons—less cost pressure in parts, electronics, and materials—though the magnitude depends on what remains via Section 232 or other targeted tools.

Housing-linked and rate-sensitive consumer areas can get a lift as well, not only from reduced input costs but from the “affordability narrative” if tariff pressure is perceived as easing. The caveat is that these groups will be trading the whole bundle (jobs + yields + tariff decision), so the same sector can rally on margin relief and then wobble on a rate spike.

Refunds are the underappreciated make-or-break detail because they’re where a legal ruling turns into real money. If tariffs are ruled unlawful, importers will pursue refunds on duties already paid, and estimates for potential refunds have been discussed in very large numbers (Reuters has referenced figures around $150 billion in play). This matters for companies because refunds can be a direct boost to cash flow (and in some cases earnings, depending on accounting treatment and whether costs were already passed through). It also matters for the government because refunds (and reduced future tariff revenue) can punch a hole in expected receipts, complicate budget math, and potentially raise questions about fiscal financing at the margin.

That fiscal angle is why bond yields are such a tricky, two-sided trade around the ruling.

If the Court strikes down IEEPA tariffs, the near-term inflation impulse could be perceived as lower (less tariff pass-through, less supply-chain friction), which is directionally supportive for lower yields—especially at the front end if it nudges the Fed’s reaction function toward more comfort on inflation. That’s the “good news = lower inflation = lower yields” storyline.

But the same ruling can be read as fiscally negative: less tariff revenue going forward and potentially large refunds going back. That can raise the term premium and pressure long-end yields higher, particularly if investors conclude the deficit trajectory worsens and Treasury supply risks increase. Reuters and other coverage have underscored that refunds and diminished tariff revenue are a central market consideration. Put differently: the ruling can be disinflationary and still bearish for long bonds if it erodes revenue and increases net issuance expectations. The curve reaction may matter more than the headline yield print: a front-end rally alongside long-end pressure (bear steepening risk) is not an impossible outcome.

Finally, on the “not front page, but don’t ignore it” side: voting rights. The Court has other major opinions pending, including cases touching the Voting Rights Act and redistricting—Louisiana v. Callais is one of the focal points in the current cycle. The timing is important: many court watchers expect big election-law rulings to cluster later in the term (the late-June wave), and even if the Court issues something earlier, there are real-world calendar constraints for map redraws before November.

From a market perspective, this is more of a second-derivative political catalyst than an immediate tape-mover. But it’s relevant because control of the House is part of the market’s base-case narrative into November. A ruling that materially changes the redistricting landscape could alter probabilities around House control at the margin, which then filters into expectations on policy areas investors care about (energy permitting and nuclear, digital assets, bank regulation, and various industrial policy levers). It’s not today’s trade—more like a headline you tag and keep in the “June risk” folder.

Bottom line: the market’s working assumption is that the Court limits IEEPA tariffs, with the first real drop-dead time for that information starting at 10:00 a.m. ET when the justices take the bench. The bigger market swing may come less from the direction of the ruling and more from the details: the scope of what’s invalidated, what happens to refunds, and how quickly the administration shifts to Plan B tariff authorities. If you want to be fully prepared, treat 10:00–11:00 a.m. as the headline blast radius—and remember that the second shoe is the workaround.